

The Break of 1404 Between the Hungarian Church and Rome

Since World War II, Hungarian historians paid relatively little attention to the late medieval church, except Professors Elemér Mályusz and Erik Fügedi. The results of the Hungarian scholarship on the subject can be stated in a few sentences. The most positive achievement of King Sigismund's fifty year's long reign (1387—1437) was its church policy, which was inspired by the clergy. The essence of this policy was the radical curtailment of papal rights in the Hungarian church and the corresponding increase of the royal right of patronage (called *főkegyűri jog* in Hungarian) in ecclesiastical affairs. The resulting independence of the Hungarian church from Rome meant that the papacy lost incomes which it earlier derived from the filling of benefices and from the appeals to the papal court. But it also meant the subjection of the Hungarian church to the state. Between 1404—17, King Sigismund either left archbishoprics and bishoprics vacant, or filled them with his own men, including barons. Also, the incomes of sees were partly diverted into the royal treasury¹.

The object of this essay is to reexamine the conclusions of the Hungarian historians about the changing relationship among the Hungarian church, the papacy and the state. The scope of the break requires clarification, its causes involve papal as well as Hungarian politics, and its consequences should be evaluated within the larger context of the relationship between church and state during the late middle ages.

The break of 1404 was part of a process that was evolving in many parts of late medieval Europe and can be summed up in the phrase: the gradual integration of the local churches into the policy. It emerged with the shift of allegiance by the French and English clergies towards their kings and against Pope Boniface VIII around 1300; it continued in acts like the English statutes of the 1350's; and it culminated in the French subtraction of obedience from the Avignonese papacy in 1398. The English statutes aimed at protecting the English church from papal demands, but the French in 1398 went further creating, in effect, a »national church«².

The French subtraction and the Hungarian break both happened during the Great Schism of the Western Church (1378—1417), during which three sets of popes, the Roman, the Avignonese and, after 1409, the Pisan, claimed the leadership of the Western Church. This confusion

¹ Barta pp. 35—40; Mályusz A konstanzi zsinat pp. 75—90.

² Kaminsky concluded that "subtraction expressed nothing but consent to a royal policy, and that the Gallican Liberties were functionally an expression of the prelates' concern to preserve their status under the new arrangements". PAPHa p. 397. For the definition of Gallican liberties in 1407 cf. Delaruelle pp. 128—29.

at the top of the hierarchically organized church accelerated the process of integration because the contending popes weakened the papacy, thus allowing increased control by powerful laymen over local churches.

There were five leading actors, or groups of actors, in the break of 1404. They were: King Sigismund of Hungary who was later, in 1410, elected German king also and was partly responsible for ending the Great Western Schism; the Roman Pope Boniface IX, renowned for his unprecedented nepotism³, whose reign (1389—1404) ended a few months after the break; King Ladislas of Naples (1386—1414), whom many Hungarian prelates and barons used as a pawn in their revolt against King Sigismund in 1402—3⁴; those Hungarian barons who remained faithful to Sigismund during the revolt of 1402—3 and were rewarded by the king with the administration of the sees of the rebel prelates after the break; and, finally, two foreign-born Hungarian prelates, Eberhard Albeni, Bishop of Zagreb and John Uski, Provost of Pécs and secret chancellor, who probably inspired the break and drew up the royal decree announcing the break.

On the 6th of April 1404, King Sigismund and the barons issued a decree (*decretum*) in the city of Pozsony (Bratislava) bearing the secret seal. It accused the papal appointees (*bullatos*) of having violated the rights of the clergy and laity in Hungary by imposing such ecclesiastical penalties (*censuras*) as "citations outside of the kingdom, excommunications, interdicts, warnings, exactions of monies and properties and burdensome extortions and contracts"⁵. The Hungarian clergy and laity appealed to the king to remove these abuses. The king responded as the defender of the status, liberties and jurisdictions of the whole kingdom and levelled another accusation against the Holy See. According to the decree, "the appointees of the Holy See and others acting by its authority had worked for the transfer of the kingdom and the crown to another during the recent revolt of 1402—3, and are still laboring tirelessly for the deposition of King Sigismund"⁶.

The decree goes on to say that the king, after he deliberated with all the important people in Hungary and "by the authority of the holy crown and of the fullness of royal authority," decided to pursue four courses of action. (1) Papal appointees could not obtain, possess or retain

³ Esch pp. 12—22, 575—81.

⁴ Cf. my *Aristocratic Revolts and the Late Medieval Hungarian State* (Seattle 1978, unpublished Ph. D. diss. University of Washington).

⁵ »citationes extra regnum, excommunicationes, interdicta, monitiones, pecuniarum, rerum et bonorum exactiones, extorsiones et pactationes gravatos.« DRH p. 181. The citations referred to the payment the newly elected prelate owed in place of his obligation to visit Rome. The quotes that follow are from the complete Latin text published in DRH pp. 180—82.

⁶ »presertim hiis proximis disturbiorum et regni nostri motionum temporibus per bullatos ac alios auctoritate sedis apostolice, quam ad nostri honoris, status et gradus deiectionem, regni nostre et corone in alium translationem, ac alias ad nostri totalem depositionem laborasse et adhuc sentimus indefesse laborare.«

ecclesiastical benefices without royal consent. (2) The prelates and the clergy could not dispose of benefices because the right of patronage was restricted to the king and the nobles. (3) Orders emanating from pope, cardinals, papal legates, auditors and judges regarding benefices and criminal and civil cases were declared invalid⁷. Finally, (4) opponents of these decisions were warned that they would incur the crime of lese majesty and will be punished accordingly⁸.

The text of the decree — also known as *placitum regium*⁹, because it made royal consent an absolute requirement in Hungarian ecclesiastical affairs — seems to confirm the general conclusion of Hungarian historians that the break resulted in the independence of the Hungarian church from Rome or any other ecclesiastical superior — since Hungary did not join the Avignonese obedience — on the one hand, and its subjection to the state, represented by the exclusive patronage rights of the king and the barons in the Hungarian church, on the other hand¹⁰.

The text of 1404 also suggests that the break was caused solely by the wide-ranging abuses of the Roman papacy and its representatives. But the decree fails to mention by name Pope Boniface IX who supposedly committed or authorized the commission of the abuses, or King Ladislas of Naples whom the pope and many Hungarian prelates and barons used against King Sigismund during the revolt of 1402—3.

The causes and the results of the break can be clarified by examining papal actions before the break and by following the implementation of the decree's decisions. This approach will not only answer the question why the Hungarian church broke with Rome, but it will make it possible to compare the change in the position of the Hungarian church with the position of two other churches, those of France and Florence, during the Great Western Schism.

A survey of Pope Boniface IX's activities between 1400—04 does not support the decree's accusation of spiritual abuses. He did not place Hungary, or any part of the kingdom, under interdict and he did not

⁷ »nullas quoque litteras apostolicas et rescripta, cuiuscunque tenoris seu legatorum, cardinalium, auditorum ac iudicum, officialium et executorum quorumcunque, sive in Romana curia, sive extra eandem... tam in casibus beneficialibus, quam in aliis quibuscunque causis litigiosis, criminalibus vel prophanis emanatas vel obtenta valeat atque possit, auctoritate regia supra-dicta irritum decernentes et inane.«

⁸ The punishment was capital punishment and confiscation of goods.

⁹ On the meaning and the use of *placet*, cf. Du Chesney.

¹⁰ In his *A magyar rendi állam Hunyadi korában* (Budapest 1958) p. 4, Mályusz implied that the prelates' policy of joining the state against the Roman pope in 1404 paid off a generation later when the church became more independent of both. But see Kaminsky's *caveat* in contrasting "a dream of freedom with the facts of subjugation." PAPHa p. 397.

¹¹ ZsO 2/1, nos. 45, 709. On "the decadence" of Hungarian monasteries after 1393 cf. Delaruelle p. 1041

oversee excommunication. Two of the seven recorded cases of excommunication were directed against persons who injured a Cistercian monastery and a church¹¹, three were absolutions¹², and two only threatened it. In one of the last cases, Boniface IX ordered the bishop of Várad (Oradea) to excommunicate the newly appointed bishop of Transylvania (Alba Iulia, Gyulafehérvár) if he did not pay, before he entered his see, the *servitium*¹³ which a Florentine banker paid for him into the apostolic chamber¹⁴. The bishop collected 3,000 gold florins before he died around 1 July 1400, but this money was appropriated by the provost and the chapter of Transylvania. A new bishop, István Upori, was elected and on 7 August 1400 Boniface IX gave him permission to be consecrated. Upori was either unwilling or unable to pay the *servitium*. Therefore, the pope translated him to another see and appointed the provost of the chapter — who helped to expropriate the *servitium* of the first bishop — as bishop. When he also failed to pay the *servitium*, the pope reinstated Upori who, as late as 27 January 1403 was still promising to pay the taxes due to Rome from himself and from his predecessors¹⁵.

The case of the see of Transylvania illustrates that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate the spiritual from the fiscal aspect of papal activity. It seems that in the case of Transylvania Boniface IX was more anxious to get money from the bishopric than to provide for the continuous and effective spiritual leadership in that diocese. Pope Boniface IX's fiscality was not unique, however. His predecessors, the Avignonese popes (1305—78), made the apostolic chamber, headed by the *camerarius* and the treasurer, the most important institution of the papacy¹⁶. Fiscality became even more rampant during the Great Schism when rival popes competed for income. A Canadian historian has noted that the concessions of the first Avignonese pope during the Great Schism, Clement VII, to the French king "encouraged a regional and national spirit among the [French] clergy, who saw Rome no longer as a protector, but as a destroyer of their liberties and rights"¹⁷. Pope Boniface IX did not make concessions to King Sigismund of Hungary on the scale of those made by his Avignonese rival. The most likely explanation is that

¹² *Ibidem* nos. 1154, 1175, 2147.

¹³ Since the early fourteenth century, all prelates had to pay a tax, the *commune servitium*, to the papal treasury — which amounted to about one — third of the annual income of the see within a certain time. Sheehan: Transylvania was one of the wealthier sees in late medieval Hungary. Mályusz, *Egyházi* pp. 180—81.

¹⁴ On the Florentine bankers in Hungary cf. Esch p. 53, n. 144.

¹⁵ ZsO 2/1, nos. 187, 287, 1142, 1432—33, 2234; Theiner p. 172.

¹⁶ Cf. G. Mollat *The Popes at Avignon 1305—1378* (London 1963) pp. 285—88.

¹⁷ Gilchrist p. 94. According to Gilchrist, Clement VII gave the French king commendatory rights to several bishoprics and 750 other benefices. *Ibidem* p. 294, n. 97.

Boniface IX was in a worse financial situation than the Avignonese pope¹⁸.

Boniface IX's actions in Hungary before the break were motivated chiefly by financial need and by political considerations. During the four years that preceded the break, he granted about two dozen indulgences, approved the holding of plural benefices by at least fourteen canons and archdeacons¹⁹, and demanded from newly appointed prelates payments owed by their predecessors. When he also insisted that the Hungarian church pay for the daily expenses of the papal legate whom he sent to prepare the way for King Ladislas of Naples to become king of Hungary, the die was cast. The fiscal and political acts of Boniface IX, not spiritual abuses, precipitated the break of 1404.

The political conflict between the Roman pope and King Sigismund began in 1400 when Boniface IX turned against the interests of the Luxemburg dynasty and supported the deposition of King Wenceslas, half-brother of King Sigismund, by the German princes and his replacement as German king by Ruprecht of Pfalz. By 31 March 1401, Boniface IX suspected that his support of Ruprecht might result in the defection of Hungary from the Roman obedience²⁰, but Sigismund's troubles at home (his imprisonment in 1401 and the revolt of 1402—3) postponed the break for three years. During Sigismund's troubles King Ladislas of Naples — whose father was king of Hungary between Dec. 1385—Feb. 1386 — made his move to gain the Hungarian throne. On 27 May 1401, he appointed a viceroy as his representative in Hungary, Croatia and Dalmatia²¹. Pope Boniface stayed neutral for a while; in July 1401 he confirmed two of Sigismund's actions concerning the Hungarian church²². Sigismund seems to have decided to break with Rome soon after his imprisonment: around November 1401 King Wenceslas notified King Charles VI of France that the Hungarian king was interested in discussing the problem of how to end the schism²³. This would explain why Bo-

¹⁸ For the worse situation of the Roman pope, cf. Favier pp. 505—24. It is difficult to decide whether Boniface IX was more needy or more greedy in Hungary. His predecessor, Urban VI, already reserved the incomes of vacant benefices in Hungary, but was apparently unable to collect them. *Ibidem* p. 323. Boniface IX may have been more demanding — as the case of Transylvania illustrates — because he ordered, on 24 May 1397, that newly elected prelates must pay all their servitium *before* they received "leur bulle de provision" ... and that "l'évêché ou le monastère serait alors considéré comme vacant depuis un an." Favier p. 390. Favier adds that these new practices of Boniface IX created a scandal. Cf. also Smyth.

¹⁹ ZsO. 2/1 nos. 51, 97, 143, 341, 992, 1018, 1038, 1065, 1190, 1246, 1265, 1275, 1284, 1298. Boniface IX also reserved at least eight benefices, one for five years, probably to the highest bidders, between 1400—04. *Ibidem* nos. 5, 109, 110, 1055, 1125, 1182, 1209, 2224.

²⁰ He wrote about this to his ambassadors in Germany. ZsO 2/1, no. 957.

²¹ *Ibidem* no. 1086.

²² *Ibidem* nos. 1161, 1162.

²³ ZsO 2/1 no. 1319. There is, however, no record to show that Sigismund was interested in working for the end of the schism at this time. But a visit

niface IX refused to receive Sigismund's envoys and even ridiculed the Luxemburg family to the Paduan envoys in March 1402²⁴.

A year later, on 23 April 1403, the pope openly sided against King Sigismund by authorizing Ladislás of Naples to use the tithes of the Neapolitan churches to gain the throne of Hungary²⁵. Less than two months later, on 1 June, Boniface appointed Angelo Cardinal Acciaiola as *legatus de later e*²⁶, and on 17 June he appointed Brando da Castiglione as papal judge-delegate and wrote to the Hungarian clergy to facilitate his passage into Hungary²⁷. Neither papal representative is recorded to have ever reached Hungary. The legate and King Ladislás sailed from Barletta on 10 July 1403 and arrived at Zara (Zadar) where Ladislás was crowned with a crown blessed by the legate²⁸.

Unfortunately for them, the pope and Ladislás acted too late. The revolt of 1402—3 was nearing its end when the king landed in Dalmatia. The legate was authorized to absolve the anti-Sigismund prelates and barons and to excommunicate those who were pro-Sigismund²⁹. But even if these sentences were made public, they had no apparent effect: the rebel prelates and barons, with a few exceptions, capitulated to Sigismund. The papal order to pay daily 33 and 1/3 gold florins for the expenses of the legate and his entourage³⁰ was disregarded by the Hungarian clergy. Only a week before the break, Boniface IX wrote to the bishop of Zengg (Senj) to use all means to get this money³¹.

The decree of 1404 that announced the break was correct in stating that Pope Boniface IX's fiscal and political, although not spiritual, acts precipitated the break. But how did the break affect the position of the Hungarian prelates and the church?

The changes in the position of the prelates after the break are easier to evaluate than the changes in the Hungarian church as a whole. The few rebel prelates who refused to submit after the revolt of 1402—3 lost their sees to trusted barons of King Sigismund. These lay adminis-

by the persuasive Simon de Cramaud, Patriarch of Alexandria, who played a leading role in the French subtraction, in Buda in April 1400 may have helped Sigismund's decision to break with Boniface. *Ibidem* no. 206.

²⁴ *Ibidem* no. 1477.

²⁵ Cutolo Vol. 1 pp. 250—58; Esch p. 398; ZsO 2/1 no. 2382.

²⁶ This was the most important representative of the medieval papacy, followed by the judge-delegate and the nuncio. Schmutz, in: SG 15 (1972) p. 463.

²⁷ ZsO 2/1 no. 2512.

²⁸ Hóman p. 521, and most Hungarian historians think that János Kanizsai, Archbishop of Esztergom, performed the coronation. But the only record of the coronation is Ladislás' letter to the Republic of Venice.

²⁹ ZsO 2/1 nos. 2458, 2468. These papal orders enabled Sigismund to blame Boniface IX, unjustly, for the revolt of 1402—3. In a letter to the cardinals after the break, dated 12 June 1404, Sigismund wrote that the pope was responsible for the death of 20,000 people in Hungary. *Ibidem* no. 3251.

³⁰ *Ibidem* no. 2495.

³¹ *Ibidem* no. 3078. The papal letter to the bishop is dated 31 March 1404.

trators (*gubernatores*) governed, for various periods, both of the archiepiscopal sees and about half of the bishoprics. The see of the unrepentant archbishop of Kalocsa (*Colocensis*) was entrusted to János Maróti, Warden of Macsó³². The bishopric of Eger, see of another recalcitrant rebel, went to another supporter of King Sigismund, the Polish-born baron Stibor³³, who also governed, for a shorter time, 1405—7, the see of the rebel archbishop of Esztergom, János Kanizsai³⁴. Other barons who served as lay governors of sees included Miklós Szécsi at Veszprém (*Vespremiensis*), the Croatian baron Károly Korbáviai at Vác (*Vaciensis*) and Pál Bessenyő at Győr (*Iauriensis*)³⁵.

The fate of the two prelates who probably inspired the break and drew up the decree of 1404 indicates that the Hungarian church came under royal as well as under baronial control. Bishop Eberhard Albeni took over the chief chancellorship from the former rebel Archbishop of Esztergom, János Kanizsai. He also served as bishop of Várad (1406—9) before resuming his career at Zagreb (1409—19). His nephew, János Albeni was bishop of Veszprém (1407—10) and Pécs (1410—21)³⁶. The prelate who worked with Eberhard, János Uski, ended his career as secret chancellor (1402—4) shortly after the break, but retained the profitable benefices he accumulated in Sigismund's service since 1398³⁷. Less than two weeks after the break, on 18 April 1404, the king ordered that Uski, "our secretary, provost of Pozsony and rector (*parochialis*) of Buda" be transferred from the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Esztergom to the jurisdiction of the royal court³⁸. No other prelate received the same treatment. Presumably Uski, a foreignborn churchman and inspirer of the break, needed special protection, or Sigismund just began to exercise his new role as "the patron and defender of all the churches of the realm"³⁹.

The other prelates, with the exceptions of the archbishop of Kalocsa and the bishop of Eger who died unrepentant in exile, were faced with several problems. They lost their right to collate to benefices⁴⁰, lay go-

³² ZsO 2/1 no. 5129. For the Hungarian bishops in the 15th century cf. Fügedi, in: TSz (1965) pp. 477—98.

³³ Ibidem no. 6650. The rebel bishop of Eger, Tamás Ludányi, died in exile.

³⁴ Stibor was "ecclesiarum Strigoniensis et Agriensis gubernator per regiam maiestatem constitutus," and as such confirmed the provost and the chapter of Eger in their liberties. Ibidem no. 3608.

³⁵ ZsO 2/1 nos. 3982, 4500, 5397, 4839. The lay governors divided the incomes of the sees between the needs of the churches and the royal treasury. Barta p. 40; Hóman p. 524.

³⁶ Bónis pp. 98, 104.

³⁷ For the career of Uski cf. Bónis pp. 96—8, 102, 104.

³⁸ ZsO 2/1 no. 3124.

³⁹ Ibidem nos. 3105, 3335, 4200, 4247, for the use of this title during the first two years after the break.

⁴⁰ There were exceptions. Archbishop János Kanizsai, for example, filled some benefices, contrary to the decree of 1404, but probably after he obtained royal approval. Mályusz A Konstanzi pp. 88—89.

vernors controlled the incomes of their sees and the royal treasury took part of that income, and lawsuits between prelates and laymen were decided in the royal court⁴¹.

The bishopric of Veszprém, in Western Hungary, is a good example of the changes that occurred in the Hungarian church. Pope Boniface IX translated the rebel bishop of Bosnia, George, to Veszprém on 9 March 1403⁴² but King Sigismund refused to recognize him. Later, the king nominated János Albeni as bishop, who held the see between 1407—10. In 1412 a Sándor is listed as *electus episcopus* but, in the same year, Pope John XXIII appointed an Italian cardinal as administrator. Royal charters listed Veszprém as vacant until 1417⁴³. Other churches besides Veszprém, notably the wealthy Priorate of Vrana (Vransko)⁴⁴, were subjected to conflicting claims by appointees of the king, popes and chapters. The break of 1404 created unprecedented confusion as well as unequalled lay control in the Hungarian church⁴⁵.

At the end, however, King Sigismund fulfilled the promise he made in 1404 to protect the rights of the clergy and laity against papal exactions. On 19 September 1417, the cardinals, including the future Martin V, the first pope of the reunited church after the Great Schism, issued a bull. The bull of the cardinals recognized the principle of royal consent in ecclesiastical affairs by excluding unilateral papal appointments to Hungarian benefices⁴⁶, recognized only legitimate appeals to the Roman court⁴⁷, and reduced the *servitium* owed by the Hungarian prelates to Rome⁴⁸. The wording of the bull of 1417 implies that the Roman popes made excessive fiscal demands on the Hungarian prelates earlier.

Hungarian historians have disagreed about King Sigismund's motives in the break of 1404. According to the majority opinion, the king did not break with the Roman papacy, only with Pope Boniface IX for sup-

⁴¹ ZsO 2/1 nos. 3657, 3942, 4388, for cases decided in 1405—06.

⁴² ZsO 2/1 no. 2303.

⁴³ M á l y u s z A konstanzi p. 107; B ó n i s p. 99.

⁴⁴ ZsO 2/1 nos. 3515, 3690, 3865, 3899, 3915.

⁴⁵ Barta p. 43. The first successor of Boniface IX, Pope Innocent VII (1404—06) offered to King Sigismund, on 24 August 1405, the right to choose his own confessor who could absolve him from all ecclesiastical penalties, including those reserved to the Holy See. ZsO 2/1 no. 4111. But no agreement was reached between the Hungarian king and the Roman popes concerning the status of the Hungarian church until the end of the schism.

⁴⁶ »Item quod sedes apostolica non intromittat se de collatione beneficiorum quorumcunque in regno Hungarie et aliis sibi annexis.« This and the following quotes are from the complete Latin text of the bull, printed by M á l y u s z, who discovered the text, in A konstanzi zsinat pp. 9—11.

⁴⁷ »Item quod nullus extrahatur extra sua regna predicta ad iudicia auctoritate litterarum apostolicarum, nisi cum cause predictorum regnorum per appellationem legitime fuerint ad sedem apostolicam devolute.«

⁴⁸ »Item tamen, quod hii, quos ad metropolitanas ecclesias promoveri postulaverit, moderatas solvent annatas ad instar ceterarum ecclesiarum nationis Germanice.«

porting Ladislas of Naples' candidacy for the Hungarian throne⁴⁹. This writer sides with the older, minority opinion⁵⁰. The decree of 1404 was not directed against Boniface IX alone. Sigismund aimed at protecting the Hungarian church from papal exactions: the bull of the cardinals in 1417 was only the final result of a long effort in that direction. Sigismund may have known that the rights of the early Hungarian kings over the church were extensive, but they were gradually reduced by the expansion of papal jurisdiction⁵¹. Whether he intended in 1404 merely to restore a situation that existed before the mid-twelfth century, or to start a new trend which eventually led to a "national church", cannot be documented from the sources⁵². But whatever were King Sigismund's motives behind his protection of the church, the break between the Hungarian church and Rome was a step in the direction of a "national church", because the "nation" around 1400 included only the barons and the upper nobility⁵³ who, with the king, controlled the church between 1404—17.

The break of 1404 stopped short of the French subtraction of 1398 and the Florentine rejection of the pope as the true pope in 1409 because the Hungarians did not deny the spiritual, only the fiscal and jurisdictional rights of the papacy. The Hungarian break resembled the stand taken by the Republic of Florence between 1375—82. During the war of Eight Saints and the Ciompi regime, the Signory repudiated the temporal claims of both the Roman and Avignonese popes, but remained faithful to Rome in spiritual matters⁵⁴.

The political situation in Hungary was not conducive for a total break from Rome in 1404. King Sigismund was not yet interested in ending the schism, in spite of some prodding by the French. The Hungarian barons were satisfied to profit at the expense of the church. Even the prelates may have found the increase of royal, if not baronial, jurisdiction over the church agreeable because they may not have had to pay more to the state than they paid to the papacy before 1404⁵⁵.

⁴⁹ Mályusz A konstanzi zsinat p. 90; Hóman p. 523; cf. Ervin Pamlényi (et al.) A History of Hungary (London 1975) p. 79.

⁵⁰ Barta pp. 35—6.

⁵¹ In 1169 King Stephen III (1161—72) formally renounced the right of the king to install and depose bishops. J. R. Sweeney p. 10.

⁵² Hóman argued, incorrectly, for an unbroken tradition of royal patronage over the church when he stated that the decree of 1404 became later "il pilastro fondamentale di quel principio del diritto ecclesiastico ungherese che già in antico aveva attribuito al 're apostolico' il diritto di patronato generale." p. 523. The 're apostolico' refers to King Stephen (died 1038) founder of the Hungarian kingdom.

⁵³ I hope to deal with this question in a forthcoming study.

⁵⁴ Martines pp. 286—310, is an excellent treatment of Florentine-papal relations during the late middle ages.

⁵⁵ There is no information about how the incomes of the churches were divided. There is data to show that the king continued the earlier practice of augmenting, restoring or penalizing the private properties of prelates. Cf. ZsO 2/1 nos. 3942, 4386, 4408.

In fact, there are several indications that the prelates accepted the new arrangement and were, therefore, distrusted by the papacy. Only a few laymen and members of the lower clergy are recorded to have appealed to Rome in violation of the decree of 1404⁵⁶. One bishop complained to King Sigismund about such an appeal by one of his priests⁵⁷. The papal distrust of the Hungarian prelates is indicated by the fact that all seven papal collectors of taxes in Hungary between 1386—1408 were of foreign origin. Everywhere else in the Roman obedience, including neighboring Bohemia and Poland the popes used some native papal collectors, except in Hungary⁵⁸.

An American medievalist concluded "that in the five years of subtraction the French church was fully integrated into the French realm; papal government could never be the same again"⁵⁹. I would like to propose that, in spite of the fact that the break of 1404 fell short of the French example, papal monarchy was never the same again in Hungary either. Unlike the French prelates, the Hungarians could not vote for the new relationship between church and state because most prelates were recently defeated or amnestied rebels. But the Hungarian church was in the process of being integrated into the realm.

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⁵⁶ *Ibidem* nos. 4129, 4139.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem* no. 3882.

⁵⁸ For the list of papal collectors in Hungary cf. Favier p. 738. For the names of collectors elsewhere in the Roman obedience *ibidem* pp. 721—41.

⁵⁹ Kaminsky, in: *PAPhA* p. 397.

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Abbreviations

- DRH = Decreta Regni Hungariae
 NCE = The New Catholic Encyclopedia
 PAPA = Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association
 SG = Studia Gratiana
 TSz = Történelmi Szemle
 ZsO = Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár